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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
BACKGROUND 
It is increasing likely that Greece will not be able to return to markets any time soon. There are two 
possible scenarios: the so called ‘Plan A’, continued official lending with perhaps voluntary private 
sector involvement, and ‘Plan B’, which should entail a significant reduction in privately-held 
Greek government debt. The goal of this Policy Contribution is to assess these two options in light 
of historical experience. 
 
MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
• Both options have serious risks. 
• The risks of Plan A relate to implementation, sufficiency, external politics, and the official 
takeover in Greek lending and thereby complete ‘socialisation’ of Greek public debt. There 
would also be a risk of a euro-area political crisis. ‘Voluntary’ private sector involvement is 
unlikely to work. 
• Plan B has the potential for creating significant adverse effects within Greece and beyond 
its borders. But since Plan B is necessary, Europe should prepare for it. A sudden default 
without preparation would have more serious adverse effects. 
• The risks for Greece mainly relate to the banking sector, because non-bank resident 
holdings of Greek debt are not large. Policymakers should explore options for bringing 
significant foreign bank ownership to the Greek banking system, which would help mitigate 
the three major problems: capital, access to liquidity and credibility to avoid runs on banks. 
If additional bank capital from private sources cannot be secured, certain EU funds should 
be used. A well-designed debt exchange and reliance on the Exceptional Liquidity 
Assistance could also help in supporting Greek banks with liquidity. 
• The relatively small direct exposure of non-Greek euro-area banks suggests that direct 
spillover is a manageable risk. But contagion is a serious worry and there is a strong case 
for a thorough ESRB analysis. However, the Greek case is fundamentally different from the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers. Also, other euro-area countries could well differentiate 
themselves from the three programme countries at a time when the probability of a Greek 
default is very high. 
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• There is a cautious case for delaying somewhat Plan B in order to prepare for it. 
• Plan B is not an alternative to fiscal adjustment, structural reforms and proper reform or 
privatisation of state-owned enterprises, but a prerequisite for a successful fiscal 
consolidation. 
• Plan B has no implication for an exit from the euro area. 
• Restructurings in emerging countries during the last 15 years were followed by a quick 
rebound in output, with GDP increasing by 17 percent on average in three years after 
restructuring. However, the Greek situation is fundamentally different and such quick 
turnaround in economic performance cannot be expected. 
• Time to market access after sovereign restructurings has shortened substantially recently. It 
largely depends on the way the restructuring is organised and if post-restructuring public 
debt is seen as sustainable.  
  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The euro-area sovereign debt crisis has entered a new phase. It is increasing likely that Greece will 
not be able to return to markets anytime soon and European policymakers disagree on the solution 
to remedy to this problem. The rating of Greek sovereign debt has been downgraded further, to the 
lowest level among countries currently rated, and secondary market yields have skyrocketed. There 
is now a very high perceived probability of a Greek restructuring.  
The euro area has entered this situation despite very significant efforts made by the Greek 
government to implement the May 2010 programme with the financial and technical support of 
European partners and the IMF. But due to difficulties in implementing the programme and the 
weaker than expected economic performance, the Greek public debt to GDP ratio has been further 
revised upwards making it even more unlikely that additional privatisation and austere measures 
will restore public debt sustainability.  
Concerns over the consequences of a Greek restructuring are justified. It has the potential to 
create significant adverse effects within Greece and beyond its borders. Yet options are limited. 
There are basically two options, differing whether a significant debt reduction is sought or not: 
 
• Plan A: Continued official lending, for as long as needed, with possible voluntary 
private sector involvement (PSI) without face value reduction and with an attempt 
to avoid a credit event (see Appendix 1 for the definition of credit events); 
• Plan B: Coercive pre-emptive or post-default restructuring of privately-held Greek 
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government debt with significant face value reduction, which can be well-prepared 
or messy; yet this option will also require the continuation of official lending (but 
on a smaller scale). 
 
The goal of this Policy Contribution is to assess these two options in light of historical 
experiences. 
  
2. CAN RESTRUCTURING BE AVOIDED IN THE EURO AREA? 
In a paper published in February 2011 Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2011) came to the 
conclusion that Greece is the only euro-area country in which public debt is unambiguously 
unsustainable1. More recent information only confirmed this assessment.  
Table 1 shows debt and primary balance forecasts for 2012. Forecasts published in November 
2010 and in May 2011 are reported in order to make it possible to assess changes in the 
conditioning information set of forecasts. 
• Greece clearly stands out in terms of public debt. Furthermore, forecasts deteriorated in the 
past half year (10.1 percentage points higher debt and 1.5 percentage points higher primary 
deficit), suggesting that in spite of significant adjustments, the May 2010 programme is not 
on track. 
• In the other countries forecasts have either improved or remained broadly stable. The 
exception in terms of debt is Portugal, where debt was revised upwards by 15 percentage 
points, yet the 107 percent level is well below Greek values, and the primacy deficit 
forecast has improved. These revisions do not change the assessment that the sizes of the 
required fiscal adjustment and the persistent primary surplus are not high enough to rule out 
sustainability. 
                                                        
1  Both Greece and Ireland have to implement very significant fiscal adjustment. But it is not only the size 
of the adjustment effort that matters. Our key indicator of solvency is the size of the primary budget 
surplus which needs to be maintained over a period of several years to achieve, in the medium term, a 
gradual return to safe levels of public debt. Here Greece stands apart from the other countries with the 
need for a historically unprecedented primary surplus, while the Irish primary surplus need is not 
extraordinary. Reasons for this difference are the lower level of Irish public debt at end-2010 and the 
better growth outlook. 
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Table 1 
 Public debt and primary balance forecasts for 2012 in selected  
euro area countries 
  Public debt in 2012 (% GDP)  Primary balance in 2012 (% GDP)  
  
Forecast 
published 
in 
November 
2010 
Forecast 
published 
in May 
2011 
Change 
in 
forecast 
Forecast 
published in 
November 
2010 
Forecast 
published 
in May 
2011 
Change 
in 
forecast 
Programme 
countries 
Greece 156.0 166.1 10.1 -0.3 -1.8 -1.5 
Ireland 114.3 117.9 3.6 -4.8 -4.2 0.6 
Portugal 92.4 107.4 15.0 -1.1 0.3 1.4 
Selected 
other 
countries 
Spain 73.0 71.0 -2.0 -2.7 -2.9 -0.2 
Italy 119.9 119.8 -0.1 1.4 1.9 0.5 
Belgium 102.1 97.5 -4.6 -1.1 -0.7 0.4 
Germany 75.2 81.1 5.9 0.6 1.2 0.6 
Source: DG ECFIN Autumn 2010 and Spring 2011 forecasts. 
 
 
Concerning Greece, the recently announced plan to raise € 50 billion in privatisation revenues 
is very ambitious. It amounts to about 22 percent of GDP and, in spite of the announced creation of 
an independent privatisation agency, it could prove difficult to implement in full. Yet even in that 
case, privatisation receipts will not be sufficient to put Greek public debt on a sustainable path (Box 
1). In spite of the clearly stated opposition of the European policy community, it is difficult to see 
how a restructuring can be avoided. 
 
Box 1 
 Updated sustainability assessment 
 
Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2011) presented a detailed sustainability assessment, which 
should be updated with more recent data and new prospects. I assume the following: 
 
• Greece will not borrow from the market, but only from the IMF and EU partners. The 
IMF borrowing and repayment will be carried out according to the modified programme 
(since the IMF cannot lend to Greece forever) and all additional borrowing to cover the 
budget deficit and the repayment of existing loans will be funded by euro-area partners 
at the modified interest rate (Euribor + spread, which is 200 basis points in the first three 
years and 300 basis points thereafter). Note that borrowing from the EFSF or EFSM, or 
even a voluntary extension of private lending to Greece at the pre-crisis interest rate 
would lead to a broadly similar overall interest rate. 
• Revenue from privatisation will be € 5 billion in each year during 2011-2013 (which is 
broadly equal to the current target) and € 17.5 billion both in 2014 and in 2015 (which is 
a rather dubious assumption in order to total privatisation revenues to € 50 billion). 
• The 2010 level of debt/GDP is set equal to the May 2011 forecast of DG ECFIN (which 
is 2.6 percentage points higher than the value of the November forecast). 
• GDP growth in 2011 and 2012 is set according to the May 2011 forecast of DG ECFIN 
(which is, in total, 0.6 percent lower than the value of the November 2010 forecasts). 
For later years I continue to use two scenarios as in Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir 
(2011). 
• Primary balance/GDP (excluding privatisation revenues) in 2011 and 2012 is set 
according to the May 2011 forecast of DG ECFIN (which is, in total, 3.3 percentage 
points lower than the value of the November 2010 forecast). Both in 2013 and in 2014 I 
assume a 2 percentage points of GDP improvement compared to the previous year. 
 
With these assumptions, in order to bring down the debt/GDP ratio to 60 percent by 2034, a 6.3 
percent of GDP persistent primary surplus is needed in every year starting in 2015 in the 
optimistic scenario, and a 9.5 percent of GDP persistent primary surplus in the cautious 
scenario. Note that in the optimistic scenario Greek debt will be € 393 billion by 2020, of which 
euro-area partners will hold € 316 billion.  6 
 
 
 7 
3. SOME LESSONS FROM RECENT DEFAULTS AND RESTRUCTURINGS 
Lessons from historical restructurings for the euro area are instructive but limited, because all 
recent restructurings took place in emerging and developing countries under different 
circumstances. However, there are important general lessons with implications for a possible 
sovereign restructuring within the euro area. 
 
3.1. CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS AND RESTRUCTURINGS 
IMPACT THE ECONOMY 
There are various channels through which a sovereign default or debt restructuring can impact the 
economy, as emphasised by, for example, IMF (2002): 
• A direct, negative wealth effect on households and non-financial corporations can squeeze 
consumption and investment; 
• Confidence can plummet and amplify the output fall; 
• Public debt restructuring can lead to a collapse of the exchange rate, which adversely 
impacts all FX borrowers; 
• Sovereign debt crises used to coincide with banking and currencies crises, amplifying the 
impact of each others; 
• The banking system has a crucial role. This involves several channels through which banks 
can be impacted and in turn impact economic activity: 
o Banks’ assets suffer directly from public debt restructuring; 
o There can be a bank run (deposit withdrawal) due to loss of confidence; 
o In the event of an exchange rate collapse, unhedged FX position of the banks can 
further compromise banks’ balance sheets, as well as losses on FX lending; 
o Shift from domestic currency to foreign currency deposits can fuel exchange rate 
depreciation; 
o The interbank market can freeze due to failing banks and lack of confidence in the 
others; 
o Interest rate hikes, which typically accompanies crises, can increase the cost of 
funding; 
o Flight to quality can impact weaker banks, as deposit can shift to healthier, often 
foreign owned, banks; 
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o In the event of a bank failure depositors can sustain losses, leading to further 
wealth effects; 
o As a consequence, credit crunch can occur and the payment system can also suffer, 
pushing the economy further down. 
• The interruption of capital inflows may force to a prompt current account adjustment (that 
typically characterises countries ending in a restructuring), which is costly in terms of 
output; 
• The impact on non-financial corporations can be mixed: highly leveraged corporations can 
suffer – either form the balance sheet effect in the case of FX borrowing, or from the 
interest rate hikes in the case of local currency borrowing –, while less leveraged firms can 
benefit from the exchange rate depreciation; 
• Restructuring of the sovereign’s obligations can undermine the confidence in the value of 
other economic contracts; 
• Finally, restructuring in a country may have spillovers and contagious effects on other 
countries, which may feed back to the country through trade and financial linkages. 
 
3.2. SOME RECENT EXAMPLES 
Restructurings have sizeable domestic costs as emphasised by eg Panizza, Sturzenegger and 
Zettelmeyer (2009). The importance of the channels discussed in the previous subsection 
determines the impacts. Yet economic outcomes after recent sovereign defaults and restructurings 
were quite favourable, especially in light of the aftermath of the Latin American debt restructurings 
of the 1980s: GDP picked up quickly and the output level in the 12 cases shown on Figure 1 was on 
average 17 percent higher three years after restructuring (see Appendix 2 for the list of these cases 
and some additional information)2. Similar results apply to employment developments.  
                                                        
2  Quarterly data is more informative than annual data, which is exemplified by the case of Argentina. The 
default occurred in Q4 2001. Average annual GDP was 11 percent lower in 2002 than in 2001, suggesting 
that there was a significant output fall after the default. But quarterly data clearly indicate that the 
dynamics was different (Figure 1): there was a sizeable output fall before the default and in the quarter of 
default, but after it there was a single quarter (Q1 2002) when GDP fell further. Note that the exchange 
rate collapsed in January 2002 with all associated consequence on foreign currency borrowers and the 
banking system. GDP started to recover already in Q2 2002. According to Blejer (2011), stabilisation of 
the banking system played a crucial role in the quick recovery. 
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Figure 1 
Quarterly GDP developments before and after twelve public debt  
defaults or restructurings during the past 15 years  
(quarter of restructuring = 100, at constant prices)  
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
T
-8
T
-4 T
T
+
4
T
+
8
T
+
12
Argentina, Q4 2001
Dominican Republic, Q2 2005
Ecuador, Q3 1999
Ecuador, Q4 2008
Indonesia, Q2 1998
Moldova, Q2 2002
Average of the 12 cases
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
80
85
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
125
130
T
-8
T
-4 T
T
+
4
T
+
8
T
+
12
Pakistan, Q3 1999
Peru, Q3 2000
Russia, Q3 1998
Ukraine, Q1 2000
Uruguay, Q2 2003
Venezuela, Q3 1998
Average of the 12 cases
 
Sources: National Institute of Statistics and Censuses of Argentina, Banco Central de la Republica 
Dominicana, OECD (for Indonesia), IMF IFS (for Moldova: only GDP in current prices is 
available that I deflated with the consumer price index), Instituto Nacional de Estadística e 
Informática (Peru), Federal Stat Statistics Service of the Russian Federation, State Statistics 
Committee of Ukraine, Banco Central del Uruguay, Banco Central de Venezuela and Kemal and 
Muhammad Farooq Arby (2004) for Pakistan. Seasonally adjusted GDP is available only for 
Ecuador; I have adjusted all other series using Census X12. 
Note: T on the horizontal axis indicates the quarter of default. See Appendix 2 for a brief 
description of the shown cases. 
 
What factors explain the minor growth impact of recent defaults and restructurings and the 
quick economic growth in the aftermath? 3 Several factors may have played a role: 
 
• It is important to observe that in six cases shown in Figure 1 (Argentina, Indonesia, the 
1999 case of Ecuador, Russia, Venezuela and Uruguay) a sizeable output fall preceded 
restructuring. On the one hand, this suggests that deteriorating economic performance may 
have brought about the default/restructuring, but on the other hand, the output fall has 
likely lead to negative output gaps and it is easier to grow when there are idle capacities; 
                                                        
3  In answering this question I draw on IMF (2002) and Sturzenegger and Zettelmeyer (2006). 
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• Support of the banking system primarily from the central banks, as governments have very 
limited resources in the midst of a crisis; 
• Some sort of deposit freeze to avert a further escalation of banking problems; 
• Some sort of restrictions on capital outflows, in some cases even on current transactions, to 
keep money inside the country; 
• Giving up the fixed exchange rate in some countries. In six of the 12 cases the real effective 
exchange rate (REER) depreciated sharply either before or after restructuring (appendix 
Figure 1), which may have boosted exports. On average across the 12 cases, REER was 10 
percent lower three years after the restructuring compared to two years before (with wide 
variations); 
• The direct wealth effect on households and non-financial corporations was limited: partly 
due to little direct holding of government papers, partly because certain groups of 
government paper holders were excluded from the restructuring (eg households in Russia), 
and partly due to the pension systems, were largely pay-as-you-go type systems and 
therefore did not have significant government bond holdings; 
• Defaults and restructurings in several cases lead to a return of domestic confidence, which 
is also reflected in access to market funding: defining “access” in terms of bond issuance or 
bank borrowing in international markets, Gelos, Sandleris and Sahay (2004) find that the 
duration of default episode has shortened considerably between the 1980s and the 1990s 
from 4.7 years to less than 1 year on average (Appendix 2).4 An earlier market access is an 
indication of improved confidence, which is supportive for economic growth; 
• Increased hydrocarbon prices in the late 1990s in the years after the Ecuadorian, Russian 
and Venezuelan defaults helped economic recovery; 
• Lesser role of the banking system in the economy lessened the impact of the banking crisis. 
For example, even though Russia suffered from a severe banking crisis after restructuring, 
the role of financial intermediation was reasonably small: credit to GDP was only about 30 
percent before the default (IMF, 2002).5 
• Fiscal tightening typically accompanied the programmes, which may had non-Keynesian 
effects due to improved confidence, and structural reforms could have boosted economic 
growth. 
 
                                                        
4  Analysing 106 episodes of default and using a stronger definition of access (as positive net transfers), 
Richmond and Dias (2009) find that countries were able to re-enter the capital market after 5.5 years on 
average in the 1980s and after 2.5 years in the 1990s. 
5  According to IMF (2002), government papers constituted 31.5 of total assets of banks in June 1998 (98 
percent of these papers were restructured). Excluding the state-owned Sberbank, which accounted for 
almost a quarter of all assets, most of the remaining top 50 banks became insolvent following the 
government default. After the failure of some banks, household deposits were transferred to the Sberbank, 
where they were guaranteed. 
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3.3. LESSONS FOR THE EURO AREA 
The situation of Greece is fundamentally different from these recent historical cases due to the 
following reasons: 
• Much higher debt level; 
• Much more important role of banking in the economy; 
• Being part of an integrated union; 
• Lack of a stand-alone central bank; 
• Lack of a stand-alone currency; 
• EU regulations prevent the adoption of some measures (eg capital controls). 
 
But there are important lessons and implications for an eventual Greek restructuring. 
First of all, the most important lesson from past crises is that the collapse of the banking system 
should be avoided. To this end, recapitalisation, continued access to liquidity will be needed as well 
as confidence to avoid bank runs. I argue in the next section that  – after ensuring that Greek banks 
will have positive values after a restructuring – selling Greek banks to major euro-area banking 
groups would bring all of these elements and there are ways to support the Greek banks with 
liquidity. 
Second, it is crucial to establish confidence. Concerning Greece, it is difficult to see how such a 
confidence can be restored in the absence of a sizeable debt reduction. Return of confidence in the 
event of debt reduction very much depends on the way the debt reduction is organised.  
Third, while real exchange rate depreciation characterised six cases, in the other six cases 
(Dominican Republic, the 2008 case of Ecuador, Moldova, Pakistan, Peru, and Venezuela) fast 
economic growth emerged after the restructuring without sizeable real exchange rate depreciation. 
Therefore, one cannot conclude that it is impossible to grow after a restructuring without real 
exchange rate depreciation. However, the non-depreciating countries had some special features 
(such as the reliance on oil revenues in the case of Venezuela) and the volumes of defaulted claims 
were generally smaller and quick solutions were found. 
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4. EURO-AREA OPTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
There are basically two options6 concerning Greek public debt, depending whether a significant 
debt reduction of privately held debt is sought or not:  
• Plan A: Continued official lending, for as long as needed, possibly with some form of 
voluntary private sector involvement (PSI) through the roll-over of existing exposure but 
without face value reduction and with the aim of avoiding a so called ‘credit event’ (see the 
Appendix for the discussion of credit events); 
• Plan B: Coercive pre-emptive or post-default restructuring with significant face value 
reduction in privately-held Greek government debt. Restructuring can either be well-
prepared or messy, yet this option will also require the continuation of official lending (but 
on a lower scale). 
Both options have several variants and my dividing line is different from recent policy 
discussions. For example, in my categorisation the positions of both the German government (‘soft 
restructuring’ implying a seven-year maturity extension of private lending at a non-market interest 
rate, but without a face value reduction) and the ECB (only a purely voluntary private sector 
involvement is acceptable) belongs to Plan A, even if the German proposition may go beyond a 
purely voluntary solution. However, there is a significant difference between the German and the 
ECB’s positions. While both could be helpful as giving more time to Greece, these options would 
not bring a significant reduction in the net present value of debt.  
 
4.1. PLAN A 
Even though news reports are conflicting, Plan A will likely continue, at least in the short run. A 
kind of private sector involvement may be sought, yet with the aim of avoiding a credit event. But 
continued official lending without debt reductions has serious risks and PSI with the aim of 
avoiding a credit event is unlikely to work, but even if it works, it will not resolve the issue of 
public debt unsustainability.  
The risks in continued official lending without a significant debt reduction are numerous. 
1. Implementation risk: Domestic social and political developments, as well as the resistance of 
the public sector which fear the loss of privileges, may hinder the proper implementation of the 
programme even if the prime minister is determined to push the programme through. 
                                                        
6  In principle, there is a third option as well: buyback of Greek debt at discounted prices by an EU-fund. 
However, as we have argued in Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2011), this is unlikely to work and 
therefore we do not discuss this option in detail here. 
 13
2. Sufficiency risk: Even if the programme will be implemented in full and all planned 
privatisation revenues will be collected, this will not make public debt to a sustainable path (see 
Section 2). 
3. Risk of downward spiral: since Plan A requires a larger fiscal adjustment and leads to a 
prolonged period of uncertainly compared to Plan B, the risk of a downward spiral, ie fiscal 
adjustment leading to a weaker economy, thereby lower public revenues and additional fiscal 
adjustment needs, is greater under Plan A than under Plan B. The downward spiral amplifies 
implementation and sufficiency risks. 
4. External political risk: Due to domestic political developments, a bilateral lender may 
unilaterally decide to stop disbursing further loans to Greece, putting official lending in jeopardy.7  
5. Risks in official takeover in Greek lending: Without a debt reduction and the consequent lack 
of market access in later years as well official creditors will continue to replace private creditors 
and eventually will hold all Greek debt. Thereby the euro area will enter a “support union”, a phrase 
coined by Wolf (2011), which may lead to a loss of sovereignty of Greece, unwarranted disputes 
between the Greek government and its official lenders, and would also create moral hazard. 
6. Risk for a Euro-area political crisis: Depending on the timing, any of the above risks can 
lead to an eventual haircut for official lending to Greece. This has the potential to create a euro-area 
wide political crisis with wide-ranging consequences. 
7. Risk of debt socialisation of other countries’ public debt: if Greece is helped out with a very 
low interest rate lending for decades, this help cannot be denied to other countries that may 
potentially need support. Therefore, the size of official lending by euro-area members could reach 
very high levels. 
 
Debates among policymakers have moved away from the pure version of Plan A without any 
private sector involvement, which was envisioned in May 2010. A growing number of 
policymakers, most loudly from the German government, demand a kind of private sector 
involvement. Motivated partly by the fears from the unknown consequences of a private debt 
reduction and partly by harsh opposition from the ECB, a solution that does not trigger a credit 
event is sought.  
However, such a private sector involvement is unlikely to deliver sufficiently. The discussion is 
about bank holdings. If at all, banks could at most be led through moral suasion to accept a 
voluntary maturity extension with the same face value. But banks holding are not particularly large: 
                                                        
7  The Slovakian parliament decided in August 2010 not to lend at all to Greece, which was not followed by 
others. However, at that time the programme just begun and other euro area partners were more 
determined to finance Greece. The political agreement on financing Greece is more fragile now and more 
and more governments recognise that the situation is unsustainable. 
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at the end of 2010 Greek banks held about 21 percent of Greek debt, while other euro-area banks 
held about an additional 16 percent (Table 2). Hence even if successful, such a maturity extension 
would bring a little relief only and at best it could give a bit more time before an ultimate solution, 
ie debt reduction, is implemented.  
But even for banks this solution is unlikely to work, as highlighted, among others, by Roubini 
(2011b). The analogy to the Vienna Initiative (VI) of early 2009 is flawed. The VI was about 
maintaining the exposure of major European banking groups to their central European subsidiaries. 
Western European banks owned the bulk of the banking system in these countries and it was their 
self interest to resolve a collective action problem (ie if a bank withdraws its operations, the 
economic situation deteriorates and hence the others will suffer, while the joint commitment make 
all better off as the situation was more about liquidity and uncertainly). But with Greece the 
situation is very much different:  
• the exposure is to the government, 
• the holdings of banks is relatively small and in particular the combined holdings of non-
Greek euro-area banks is only 16 percent,  
• the collective maintenance of these bank exposures will not make the situation sustainable, 
because the issue is solvency, and a significantly large reduction in the net present value of 
Greek debt is not pre-emptively negotiable in a purely voluntary way, 
• and it is uncertain whether a private sector involvement, which is labelled voluntary, would 
not or would constitute a credit event: the ultimate decision rests on a committee (see 
Appendix 1) that may conclude that the rescheduling was partly forced. 
Also, the interest rate to be applied to the rolled over debt is at question: market rates would 
make the situation even more unsustainable (compared to the alternative of official lending), while 
the incentive for low (ie non-market) rates is zero, unless senior creditor status or collateral is 
provided, which are not justified by the situation. 
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Table 2. 
 Holdings of gross public debt in selected countries 
 (€ billion at face value, end-2010) 
Source: updated from Darvas, Gouardo, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir (2011). 
 
 
4.2. PLAN B 
Having said that Plan A, even with a ‘voluntary’ roll-over of banks’ exposures, is unlikely to work, 
the implications of Plan B should be assessed. This is a very difficult and contentious task. Under 
Plan B I envisage a sizeable reduction in the net present value of privately held Greek public debt8. 
Therefore, I do not consider other alternatives, such as a partially coercive debt exchange with the 
same face value (Roubini, 2011a), because that would not solve the solvency problem and would 
just postpone the necessary debt reduction some years into the future; see also Pisani-Ferry (2011). 
Therefore, Plan B in my understanding will constitute a credit event and its consequences should be 
assessed.  
Before discussing Plan B, two important features should be highlighted. 
• First, Plan B is not an alternative to fiscal adjustment, structural reform and proper reform 
or privatisation of state-owned enterprises: these should continue. But Plan B is a 
necessary condition for achieving a successful fiscal adjustment. 
• Second, the Greek government will need official financing after a restructuring or default, 
albeit at a reduced level compared to Plan A. This is because Greece still has (and is 
forecasted to have, see Table 1) a budget deficit, including a primary deficit. Market access 
may return once a sustainable situation has been achieved, but there will be an interim 
                                                        
8  I do advocate that Greece should pay back in full all emergency assistance received form official 
creditors since May 2010 and the face value reduction should apply to privately held debt only. Yet there 
is a rationale for further lowering of the official lending interest rate to Greece (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and 
Sapir, 2011). Whether (and if so, how) ECB bond holdings can be excluded from the haircut is a valid 
question (see section 4.5).  
Programme countries Other countries
Greece Ireland Portugal Belgium Italy Spain
Total debt 329 153 160 341 1,843 639
Domestic banks 69 9 22 31 252 229
Other euro-area banks 54 13 35 55 191 81
Other banks 6 9 6 n/a n/a 23
Non-banks (domestic and foreign) 119 100 77 255 1,400 305
ECB 50 22 21 0 0 0
IMF/EU 32 0 0 0 0 0
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period and given the specific features of the Greek situation (see section 3.3), it is difficult 
to foresee the length of this period. 
Plan B can be a coercive debt exchange before actually declaring a default, or a restructuring 
post-default. The impact of the second possibility would likely be more damaging. The concerns 
with a Greek restructuring can be divided into two main categories:  
1. possible impact on Greece, and  
2. possible spillover/contagion effects on the rest of the euro area and even on countries 
outside the euro area. 
 
4.2.1. Impact on Greece 
With regards to impacts on Greece, the direct wealth effect on households and non-financial 
corporations from a haircut for government debt may not be too large. According to estimates of 
Barclays Capital (2011), € 29.0 billion of the € 284 billion marketable Greek government papers are 
held by resident 'Mutual funds, pension funds and others' and an additional € 5.6 billion by Greek 
residents other than banks, insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds and monetary 
authorities. Altogether, these holdings constitute approximately 15 percent of GDP. Some of these 
holders may have already marked to market their holdings, implying that the additional impact of a 
haircut could not be large. The drag on economic growth (through reduced demand due to wealth 
effect) also depends on the distribution of these holdings among the various investor groups.  
The main concern is the stability of the Greek banking system. For the banks the crucial issues 
are new capital (as losses will likely wipe out current capital), access to liquidity (as the defaulted 
bonds will likely not be eligible anymore at ECB operations) and the avoidance of bank runs.  
All of these tasks are extremely difficult to handle. The situation would be much better with 
significant foreign ownership in the Greek banking system, which would bring credibility and 
stability to the Greek banking system and additional capital and liquidity if needed. The presence of 
foreign banks can also avert bank runs. Historical examples show that at times of stress 
domestically owned banks suffer more than foreign owned banks and even there were capital 
flights from domestically owned to foreign owned banks. The recent experiences of Central and 
Eastern European countries support this observation.  
 
Therefore, a priority should be to bring foreign ownership to the Greek banking system 
(Darvas, 2011), which is not an easy task. Capital loss can be so substantial after a sizeable debt 
reduction that the residual value of Greek banks could be too small or even negative. Consequently, 
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recapitalisation from an official source9 and/or the bail-in of some creditors of Greek banks may be 
needed before inviting foreign banking groups to acquire Greek banks. But the difficulties with the 
solution should not hinder a proper analysis of this option and preparation for it, since bringing 
foreign ownership to the Greek banking system would be the best solution among various 
alternatives to save Greek banks in the event of a sizeable public debt reduction. 
The second best solution is recapitalisation of Greek banks from official EU money, such as 
from the European Investment Bank, or (if its mandate is amended) the European Financial 
Stability Facility (EFSF), or from a specially designed new banking fund of the EU. Investing EU 
money into Greek banks is still much better solution than Plan A, which carries the risk of 
significant direct losses to EU lenders (section 4.1), and also much better than let the Greek banking 
system collapse. Bank shares held by the EU could be sold later. 
Access to liquidity is a further crucial problem of Greek banks. According to market estimates, 
Greek banks have posted approximately € 70 billion of Greek government papers at the ECB as 
collateral for liquidity. The ECB has rightly indicated that defaulted/restructured bonds, with their 
legal uncertainty and unknown recovery values, cannot be considered as eligible collaterals. An 
immediate recall of ECB liquidity would likely render most Greek banks bankrupt absent 
alternative options for access to liquidity. One option is bringing foreign ownership to Greek banks, 
which –at least partially– could mitigate the liquidity problem. A second option would be a debt 
exchange of Greek government bonds: either to a new bond of the Greek state supported by 
appropriate collateral, or a Brady-type bond10 guaranteed by, for example, the EFSF. A third option 
is a liquidity provision by the Greek central bank with the Exceptional Liquidity Assistance (ELA) 
facility (see Box 2).  
 
 
                                                        
9  The EU-IMF programme put aside €10 billion for bank recapitalisation. This amount may be broadly 
sufficient even in the event of a large haircut for Greek public debt because Greek banks hold €69 billion 
of Greek public debt (see Table 2) and have bank capital and reserves of approximately €44 billion (see 
http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/browse.do?node=2019194). 
10 See Clark (1993) on the Brady-plan. 
Box 2 
 
 Exceptional Liquidity Assistance (ELA) by national  
central banks of euro-area countries 
 
Central banks used to have certain means for emergency liquidity support (see eg Padoa-
Schioppa, 2003) and this is the case in the Eurosystem as well. The facility is called Emergency 
Liquidity Assistance (ELA). This facility is in the hands of the national central banks and can be 
used over and above the assistance provided by the ECB (Buiter, Michels and Rahbari, 2011). 
The statutes of the ECB and the European System of Central banks (ESCB) state that: 
 
“14.4. National central banks may perform functions other than those specified in this Statute 
unless the Governing Council finds, by a majority of two thirds of the votes cast, that these 
interfere with the objectives and tasks of the ESCB. Such functions shall be performed on the 
responsibility and liability of national central banks and shall not be regarded as being part of 
the functions of the ESCB.” 
 
Buiter, Michels and Rahbari (2011) further highlight that the existing legal documents and 
recommendations make it clear that ELA facilities are “for most purposes, a national matter, 
with details [of their] scope, terms and procedures to be spelt out in national legislation and 
arrangements” (Buiter, Michels and Rahbari, 2011, p. 4). They further stress that although 
national central banks are not constrained by the rules that apply to ESCB operations, a certain 
number of restrictions still apply: prohibition of overdraft facilities for official bodies, of 
purchasing government bonds, and of carrying out tasks that go beyond those of a central bank 
(such as supporting insolvent institutions).  
 
Full disclosure of the terms and conditions of ELA facilities is not required, and has not been 
published by the central banks most active in using them. The amounts of ELA financing 
provided can be inferred from the balance sheets of central banks, grouped under the “Other 
Assets” category, but the breakdown and the amounts specifically concerning ELA are not 
available. 
 
Although these facilities do not require explicit approval of the ECB, they can be terminated by 
vote if they are deemed to run counter to the ECB’s mandate. Moreover, the same degree of 
independence is required for national central banks performing ELA functions as they enjoy in 
carrying out ESCB-related operations. 
 
In the euro-area the National Bank of Belgium provided an ELA to Fortis Bank between 26 
September 2008 and 9 October 2008 amounting to € 51 billion in the peak (according to Irish 
Independent, 2011). The Central Bank of Ireland has been using this facility for a much longer 
period and estimates suggests that currently it amounts to about € 50 billion.  18
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4.2.2. Spillover and contagion 
The second major concern with Plan B is the possible spillover and contagious effects. Spillover 
can be assessed with data on exposures and this seems to be a manageable risk. But nobody really 
knows much about contagion and various views that are expressed are not based on thorough 
analyses.  
As for spillovers, the € 54 billion direct bank combined exposure of euro-area banks outside 
Greece is sizeable, but not large (Table 2). Outstanding credit default swap (CDS) positions are also 
not large: the net positions amount to € 3.5 billion and the gross positions to € 52 billion (Table 3 – 
see the note to the table on the definition of gross and net positions and Appendix 1 for further 
details). Gross position could matter in a crisis situation when counterparties deny to honour their 
obligations, or when a major counterparty fails. Lacking bank-specific data, it is difficult to assess 
whether any major bank or other financial institution is at risk. But the small amount of the net CDS 
positions along with the relatively small direct bank holdings of Greek government bonds, which 
are distributed among several banks, suggests that the direct impact of a Greek restructuring in itself 
may not threat the failure of a major financial institution, and eventual recapitalisation need may 
not be excessive. 
Table 3.  
Outstanding credit default swap (CDS) positions as registered by Depository Trade and 
Clearing Corporation (DTCC) (€ billion), 25 May 2011 
 
 Gross Net 
Belgium 35.7 5.1 
Germany 65.6 11.4 
Greece 51.8 3.5 
Ireland 26.8 2.9 
Italy 186.8 17.2 
Portugal 42.8 4.5 
Spain 98.1 12.6 
Note: we report the outstanding positions in € billions, while most news reports indicate values in $ billions. 
The gross notional amount is the sum of all CDS contracts bought (or sold). The gross figure does not take 
into account the fact that market participants can (and do) simultaneously buy and sell protection on the same 
reference entity. The net notional values are calculated with reference to individual market participants, and 
are equal to the sum of net protection bought (or sold) by net buyers (or net sellers). As such, they represent 
the maximum possible net funds transfers between net sellers and net buyers. See more details in Appendix 1. 
The table shows trades registered with DTCC; there could be other trades as well. 
Source: Depository Trade and Clearing Corporation 
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The more difficult question is outright contagion to other sovereign borrowers and threats to 
financial stability of the euro area financial system. This is primarily because a restructuring would 
signal a change in the policy stance of the official community. If Greece defaulted, markets could 
panic, denying funding for other weaker countries and pushing them into default, too. An attempt to 
pull off a 'concerted default' by several peripheral countries at once could lead to a renewed banking 
crisis in core eurozone countries such as Germany and France since their banks are exposed by their 
loans to the governments (or to banks backed by their governments) in these peripheral eurozone 
sovereign member states. 
This is indeed a major concern and warrants a thorough analysis, for which the ESRB would be 
the most suitable institution (Wolff, 2011). 
While I cannot assess the risk of contagion, it is instructing to compare the September 2008 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, a major US investment bank, to a possible restructuring of Greece, 
because Lehman’s case has often been cited as illustrating the potential consequences of a Greek 
sovereign default. The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers led to a spike in perceived counterparty risk 
and a subsequent freeze of the interbank lending markets. But the differences between the cases of 
Lehman and Greece are striking. Table 4 compares the two cases along various dimensions. In 
short, Lehman Brothers was a highly interconnected systemically important financial institution 
(SIFI) and its bankruptcy emerged rather suddenly in a very uncertain environment. Greece is not a 
SIFI, exposures to Greece are reasonably well known, restructuring of Greek debt is widely 
expected, and the global financial architecture carries less risk now. 
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Table 4 
 Systemic implications of the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers  
and the looming restructuring of Greek public debt 
 Lehman Brothers Greece  
CDS exposure When Lehman Brothers failed, there was vast uncertainty 
concerning CDS exposures to Lehman. Initial estimates 
suggested that gross claims could reach $ 400 billion 
(Duquerroy, Gauthier and Gex, 2009), but figures 
published one month after the event showed $ 72 billion of 
gross notional outstanding on Lehman, and a $ 6 billion net 
exposure (ECB, 2009). Overall, only $ 5.2 billion changed 
hands following the auction and settlement.  
Transparency on CDS 
exposures has increased since 
then and exposure to Greece 
is reasonably well known. 
Further initiatives could 
increase market awareness.  
Counterparty to 
CDS trades 
Lehman was a significant counterparty to CDS trades, ie 
investors had bought insurance from Lehman 
Not a counterparty 
Issuer  of short-
term debt 
Lehman was a significant issuer of short-term debt and its 
paper was considered attractive by funds investing in 
money markets. In the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy 
investors shunned commercial paper and other forms of 
short-term debt, prompting Fed action to substitute private 
investors with purchases of short-term private debt. 
Since April 2010 only 
marginal issuances of short-
term debt  
Broker-dealer Lehman was also an important broker-dealer of securities. 
As a consequence of the bankruptcy procedure, investors 
that had placed investment assets with Lehman’s broker-
dealer units to serve as collateral lost access to these assets 
(at least for the duration of the procedure). This prompted 
the liquidation of other assets. 
Not a broker-dealer 
Business model Coming a few months after the demise of Bear Sterns, 
Lehman’s failure was regarded as a signal that the business 
model of investment banks was vulnerable.  
Greece was not a prototype of 
euro-area fiscal management  
Bail-out The refusal by the US government to bail-out Lehman had 
the broader consequence of signalling that bankruptcy of a 
well-known financial player was a possibility. This 
resulted in an across-the-board re-pricing of risk. 
Greece was given official help 
and restructuring will come 
when the failure of the 
programme becomes obvious. 
The Greek restructuring does 
not impact official help to 
other countries (Ireland and 
Portugal). Yet it would signal 
that sovereign restructuring is 
a possibility in the euro area.  
Suddenness  The bankruptcy of Lehman was largely unexpected. As 
Figure 2 indicates, the CDS spread on Lehman was around 
160 basis points in May 2008 and about 300 basis points in 
later months up to 9 September 2008. Only three working 
days prior to its bankruptcy, the CDS spread increased to 
about 600 basis points. 
Greek CDS spreads have 
hovered around 800 basis 
points from April 2010 to 
early 2011 and have risen 
above 2000 basis points since 
then (Figure 3).  
Stability of the 
global financial 
system and 
global economic 
outlook 
At the time of Lehman’s bankruptcy there was an extreme 
uncertainty concerning the global financial system and 
economic outlook.  
While we cannot claim that 
the financial crisis is over, the 
uncertainty surrounding the 
global financial system has 
declined and economic 
growth has resumed in most 
countries. 
Sources: Information on Lehman Brothers was taken mostly from Fender, Frankel and Gyntelberg (2008), 
with some additions from Duquerroy, Gauthier and Gex (2009) and ECB (2009). The assessment of the 
Greek situation is mine.  
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Figure 2 
 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread on major US investment banks, 
2 Jan 2007 – 20 June 2011, in basis points 
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Source: Fender, Frankel and Gyntelberg (2008) and Bloomberg. 
Note: The time series for Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch end on the date of the announcement of 
their acquisitions: 16 March 2008 for Bear Stearns (later acquired by JP Morgan Chase) and 14 
September 2008 for Merrill Lynch (later acquired by the Bank of America). 
 
Therefore, the case Greece is fundamentally different from the default of Lehman Brothers, but 
without access to detailed data one cannot assess the possible contagious effects of a Greek 
restructuring, be it pre-emptive or post-default.  
In this regard Ireland and Portugal are not really issues, since both countries are already out of 
the market: neither their governments, nor their banks borrow from market sources. A possible 
turbulence in their secondary government bond market could only hurt the holders of their debt. 
The defining countries are Spain, Italy and Belgium, which are sometimes indicated as being at 
risk in the event of a Greek restructuring. This worry has to be taken seriously. But these countries 
could well differentiate themselves from the three programme countries at a time when the 
probability of a Greek restructuring has increased to very high level (Figure 3), largely because 
these countries have indeed much better fundamentals. 
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Figure 3 
 5-year credit default swap (CDS) spread on sovereigns, 
2 Jan 2008 – 20 June 2011, in basis points 
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   Source: Datastream 
 
European policymakers could do a lot to reduce the contagion risk by dispelling the fog of 
doubt surrounding their banks by finalising the stress tests initiated by the EBA, publishing 
comprehensive results and recapitalizing the banks that need it (Darvas, Pisani-Ferry and Sapir, 
2011). A ban on bank dividends or bonuses, which could contribute to self-recapitalisation, could 
also be considered. 
 
4.3. TIMING: WAIT FOR OR RUSH TO PLAN B? 
While Plan B is necessary in my assessment (and the only reason for not being inevitable is that 
euro-area partner governments could hoard all Greek debt), its timing can be chosen within certain 
limits. The main arguments for waiting are:  
• a proper programme for supporting Greek banks can be put in place; 
• adjustment in other euro-area countries can advance, lessening the risk of contagion; 
• banks in other countries can better prepare, which should be fostered by stringent stress 
tests and recapitalisation if needed;  
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• the potential for privatisation in Greece can be better assessed and thereby the haircut can 
be better calibrated; 
• it would give time for thorough studying of the systemic implications of a Greek 
restructuring.  
 
The arguments for a swift restructuring: 
 
• a delay will increase the official share in Greek debt and private creditors with maturing 
debt will be paid in full in the meantime, leading to higher haircuts for the remaining 
privately held part, or even haircut for official lending with the potential of a deep political 
crisis (Section 4.1); 
• a delay risks a disorderly outcome should the social and political situation deteriorate in 
Greece; 
• restructuring could end the uncertainty that currently is hampering private investment and 
consumption in Greece; 
• a restructuring, seen as a fair burden sharing with foreign creditors, may increase the 
ownership of the current fiscal and structural adjustment programme and hence can lead to 
better implementation and less resistance from Greek social and political partners;  
• if restructuring is well prepared and proper measures are implemented in advanced to 
contain contagious effect, Greece may gain market access sometime after the restructuring. 
This could have a stabilising impact on the government bond markets of other euro-area 
countries as well; 
• a delay will prolong the euro-area sovereign debt crisis, which could damage the prestige of 
the EU. 
 
The decision on timing should weight these pros and cons. Since the stability of the Greek 
banking system is crucial and stress-testing and recapitalising of other euro-area banks will take 
some time, it would be worth waiting a few quarters until proper measures are put in place.  
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4.4. EXIT FROM THE EURO AREA? 
Even though legally impossible and it would blow up the European integration process since 
WWII, some argue for an exit from the euro area in the event of Plan B. I disagree with this 
suggestion and claim that Plan B should have no implication for exit from the euro area. A more 
substantial argument in favour of an exit is the growth enhancing impact of the likely depreciation 
of the new Greek drachma. Unfortunately, we also lack a thorough analysis of the pros and cons of 
this issue. Let me briefly mention a few factors that could be considered.  
Greece is relatively closed economy, even when considering tourism, and the share of the 
manufacturing sector (the sector that typically produces most of the export goods) is the lowest 
among the euro-area countries. The assessment of the price-wage competitiveness problem of 
Greece is a controversial issue: different studies arrive at different conclusions. Even though an 
improvement in price-wage competitiveness could help any country, Greece has an enormous 
potential to improve the non-price dimensions of its competitiveness (Brau, 2011). For example, in 
2010 Greece ranked only 109 out of 185 countries in the Ease of Doing Business indicator of the 
World Bank. Also, growth in the short term could be helped with a quick mobilisation of idle 
Structural Funds (Marzinotto, 2011) and with a proper restructuring that ends uncertainty.  
An exit from the euro area would bring the “mother of all financial crises” as described by 
Eichengreen (2007a and 2007b), since all financial assets would leave the country absent capital 
controls. An exit would render most of the private sector with debt bankrupt. Since the current 
liabilities of corporations and households are denominated in euros, they would become 
increasingly expensive to pay off in the depreciating new Greek drachma that were likely losing 
value against the euro. A sharp depreciation of the exchange rate could push much of the country’s 
private sector into bankruptcy and lead to extensive litigation against “bad debtors” in the country. 
A forced exchange from euro denominated debt to new Greek drachma would have similar effect. 
Widespread bankruptcies of domestic firms and households would stress Greek banks much more 
than the restructuring of the sovereign debt. Such a situation would constrain any bank lending for 
many years. 
An exit from the euro area would have other adverse effects as well. The low credibility of the 
newly stand-alone Greek central bank would likely lead to much higher real interest rates as well as 
to a period of high inflation. All of these would be drags on economic growth.  
Concerning retail interest rates, Table 5 indicates that private sector in Greece, Ireland and 
Portugal still enjoy reasonably low interest rates, which are well below the government bond yields 
of their sovereigns. This is most likely a euro-area effect, since the private sector in non-euro area 
countries pay rates above their sovereigns as the sovereign is typically considered the benchmark. 
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But in the euro area another sovereign can also serve as the benchmark. Therefore, with an exit 
from the euro area the Greek private sector would face much higher interest rates (in real terms as 
well) with negative implications for growth and welfare. 
 
Table 5: 
Selected interest rates in euro-area and non-euro area countries, April 2011 
  Corporate loans Household loans 
Government bond 
yields 
  
Up to and 
including 
EUR 1 
million 
Over EUR 
1 million Housing 
Consumptio
n 2 year 10 years 
Eu
ro 
are
a 
Belgium 4.5 2.2 3.9 6.3 2.4 4.3 
Germany 5.4 3.1 4.1 6.2 1.8 3.3 
Greece 5.5 5.6 4.3 10.2 19.6 13.9 
Ireland 5.5 3.2 3.5 6.4 9.9 9.8 
Italy 4.9 2.7 3.0 7.6 3.0 4.8 
Portugal 6.7 5.0 3.4 9.8 10.2 9.2 
Spain 4.8 3.2 3.2 7.5 3.3 5.3 
No
n-
eur
o 
are
a 
Czech 
Republic 4.6 n.a. 4.6 13.9 1.7 4.1 
Hungary 8.9 n.a. 10.4 23.4 n.a. 7.1 
Poland 9.2 n.a. 7.2 15.9 5.0 6.1 
Romania 11.9 n.a. 9.0 11.8 n.a. 7.3 
Sweden 4.2 n.a. 4.5 n.a. 2.8 3.3 
UK n.a. n.a. 4.6 7.5 1.2 3.8 
Source: ECB except the 2-year government bond yield, which is from Datastream. 
Notes. Corporate and household loans are weighted averages of different maturities for euro-area countries as 
calculated by the ECB, but unweighted averages of less than 1, between 1 and 5, and more than 5-year loans 
for the non-euro area countries. For non-euro area countries only domestic currency loans are considered. 
Corporate loans: Loans other than revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, 
New business. Housing loans: Lending for house purchase excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, 
convenience and extended credit card debt, New business. Consumption loans: Loans for consumption 
excluding revolving loans and overdrafts, convenience and extended credit card debt, New business.  
 
4.5. IMPACT ON ECB 
A Greek debt restructuring would directly impact the ECB through: 
• own Greek bond holdings, which were acquired though the Securities Market Programme 
(SMP), and  
• the Greek bonds that banks placed as collateral for ECB liquidity. 
 
The indirect channels may relate to: 
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• financial stability of the euro area, and 
• a change in the economic and inflationary outlook of the euro area. 
 
Lack of proper transparency of SMP makes it difficult to assess the impact of an eventual 
Greek debt restructuring on the ECB’s balance sheet. Market estimates suggest that the ECB bought 
Greek government bonds for approximately € 40 billion at market prices, which could be € 50 
billion at face value. I do not want to speculate about the needed haircut in the event of a 
restructuring, but for illustration I can consider a 50 percent reduction in the net present value of 
debt, which is a typical estimate of some analysts. This would lead to an approximately € 15 billion 
loss for the ECB, which should be borne by member states according to their capital share in ECB. 
Yet in past restructurings several countries excluded certain investor groups from losses. The ECB 
holdings of Greek debt may also be excluded.  
The ECB’s position of excluding defaulted bonds from eligible collaterals is justified. 
However, the Eurosystem should prepare for an eventual Greek debt restructuring and other ways 
to support Greek banks with liquidity should be explored (section 4.2.1) and made instantly 
available in the event of a sudden disorderly default. 
As discussed in the previous sections, it is difficult to predict the likely impact of a Greek 
public debt restructuring on the financial stability of the euro area. The ECB should stand ready to 
safeguard euro-area financial stability in the event of adverse effects, as it did during the recent 
financial crisis. 
Finally, it is also difficult to predict the likely impact of a Greek public debt restructuring on the 
economic and inflationary outlook of the euro area. Yet a debt restructuring (or the lack of it) 
should not impact the conduct of monetary policy, which should consider euro-area aggregates. 
 
 
5. SUMMARY 
There is a growing recognition that the Greek government will not be able to borrow from the 
market anytime soon, and there is an intense debate about possible responses. The so called ‘Plan 
A’, continued official lending with perhaps a voluntary private sector involvement, is unlikely to 
work and has various risks, including the hoarding of all Greek debt by official creditors and the 
potential of a political crisis. The hoarding of all Greek public debt in the hands of euro-area 
partners ('debt socialisation') may not serve the best interests of Greek and other EU citizens, and 
would also require wide-ranging changes to the functioning and the institutional framework of the 
EU, which does not seem to be a political reality at present. A sufficiently large debt reduction is 
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not pre-emptively negotiable without coercion. ‘Plan B’, which should entail a significant debt 
reduction in privately-held Greek sovereign debt, is therefore necessary. But it is also risky: it has 
the potential to create significant adverse effects within Greece and beyond its borders. But since it 
is necessary, European policymakers should prepare for a Greek debt restructuring, because an 
unplanned default would have more serious impacts. 
Debt restructuring in Greece is not an alternative to fiscal adjustment, structural reforms and 
proper reform or privatisation of state-owned enterprises, but a prerequisite for a successful fiscal 
consolidation. Debt restructuring does not have an implication for exit from the euro area. 
There are various channels through which a sovereign debt restructuring can undermine 
economic performance and there are serious domestic costs. Yet restructuring in emerging countries 
during the past 15 years has been followed by a quick rebound in output, with GDP increasing by 
17 percent on average in three years after restructuring. However, there are obvious differences 
between Greece and these emerging countries, suggesting that such a quick turnaround in economic 
performance should not be expected in Greece after a restructuring. Greece has much higher level 
of debt and a sizeable banking sector, the country is part of an integrated monetary union, it does 
not have a stand-alone central bank or currency, and EU regulations exclude certain measures that 
were implemented during emerging country debt restructuring episodes. 
In preparing for the debt restructuring, several measures should be implemented to strengthen 
the Greek banking system, but also the banking systems in other euro-area countries. For Greek 
banks, new capital, access to liquidity and confidence to avoid bank runs are the crucial issues, in 
which foreign bank ownership would be a significant plus. Policymakers should explore options for 
bringing significant foreign bank ownership to the Greek banking system after ensuring that Greek 
banks will have a positive value after a restructuring. If additional bank capital from private sources 
cannot be secured, it would be still better to use certain EU funds than let the Greek banking system 
collapse. A well-designed debt exchange and the reliance on the Exceptional Liquidity Assistance 
could also help Greek banks by supporting them with liquidity. Concerning the banking system of 
other euro-area countries, proper stress-testing and recapitalizing of banks that need it should have a 
very high priority to contain contagious effects. A ban on bank dividends or bonuses, which could 
contribute to self-recapitalisation, could also be considered. 
It is very difficult to assess the possible contagious effects of an eventual Greek restructuring. 
The case of Greece will be clearly different from the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, because 
Greece is not a systemically important financial institution, exposures to Greece are reasonably well 
known, restructuring of Greek debt is widely expected, and the global financial architecture carries 
less risk now. But the possible contiguous effects should not be underestimated and there is a case 
for a careful study by the ESRB. 
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The crucial issue is timing. There are both cons and pros for waiting for a while and for a swift 
restructuring. Waiting would further increase the official financing share in Greek debt, prolong 
uncertainty, risk a disorderly outcome, and damage to the prestige of the EU, but would also give 
time to prepare, to understand the risks, and to allow other euro-area countries to accelerate and 
advance with their adjustments. A swift restructuring, on the other hand, could end the uncertainty, 
may increase the ownership of the current fiscal and structural adjustment programme and may lead 
to earlier market access, thereby helping economic recovery. Since the uncertainty about the 
possible impact of a Greek restructuring is very high and Greek banks are not yet prepared to 
withstand the losses, there is cautious case for waiting. Also, it would be very important that 
policymakers from various EU institutions and countries come to an agreement on the most 
adequate solution, which will also take time. 
Last but not least, the EU should mobilise idle Structural Funds to foster economic growth in 
Greece and in other countries struggling with fiscal and structural adjustment (Marzinotto, 2011). 
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7. APPENDIX 1: CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS (CDS) AND CREDIT EVENTS11 
Credit default swaps (CDS) have received considerable attention since the beginning of the 
financial crisis, not least because of the part they played in amplifying market reactions following 
the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. Credit Default Swaps have also repeatedly been 
put under the spotlight in the context of the euro-area crisis: in the early days they were blamed for 
fuelling excess volatility and “jeopardis[ing] the stability of the whole financial system” (BaFin, 
2010), leading to a ban on naked selling of CDS written on euro-area sovereigns by the German 
financial regulator. More recently, they have re-entered discussions as one of the channels through 
which the consequences of a sovereign default or restructuring of a sovereign’s debt could be 
amplified.  
 
7.1. DEFINITION OF CREDIT DEFAULT SWAPS 
Credit Default Swaps are the most common form of credit derivatives. They allow investors to 
transfer the risk of default to the entity selling protection, or to gain exposition to credit risk without 
entering into a loan agreement or purchasing a bond. The protection buyer pays a quarterly 
premium (the spread) to the seller of protection until a credit event occurs or until the contract ends. 
Market participants include banks, hedge funds, asset manager and insurers, the latter having larger 
net seller positions at industry level. 
Although regulators and industry organization have make significant steps in standardising 
credit derivatives and moving trades to central counterparties, the vast majority of CDS trades still 
take place Over-the-Counter. Consequently, transparency is low and counterparty risk remains 
high. However, since the beginning of the crisis, statistics on the net and gross amounts of 
outstanding single-name CDS contracts have been published every week by the Depository Trade 
and Clearing Corporation (DTCC), allowing closer monitoring of aggregate exposures. 
 
 
7.2. SETTLEMENT 
If a credit event (see the next section) that is defined in the terms of the contract occurs, the 
protection seller is required to compensate the protection buyer. In practice there are two basic 
settlement procedures for CDS contracts. In a physical settlement, the protection buyer delivers the 
                                                        
11 This appendix has been prepared by Christophe Gouardo. 
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defaulted obligation to the protection seller and receives compensation for the full notional value of 
the obligation (meaning, in the case of naked credit default swaps, that the buyer of protection first 
needs to acquire the bond on the market, which can be troublesome if many participants are 
attempting to do the same thing). In a cash settlement, the protection buyer receives the difference 
between the notional value of the defaulted obligation and its price on the market or as determined 
by an auction process. In the cash settlement, the fund transfer from the protection seller to the 
protection buyer upon the occurrence of a credit event is in fact lower than the insured amount, and 
ultimately depends on the recovery rate and the amount of collateral already posted to guarantee 
against counterparty risk. 
The 2009 Supplement and Restructuring Supplement (which also apply to legacy trades for 
those that have entered into the “Big Bang” and “Small Bang” protocols) require market 
participants to settle CDS transactions through market auctions (to determine a single market-wide 
reference price for the impaired assets). Although these auctions do not allow for multilateral 
netting, they allow orderly and rapid settlements via standardized procedures and a central 
architecture that market participants have acquired significant experience with in the past years 
(FSB Senior Supervisors Group, 2009), thus mitigating some of the risks that stem from large gross 
system-wide exposures and the complexity of the web of bilateral positions. However, the 
increasing use of collateralisation as a means to limit the counterparty risk borne by buyers in CDS 
contracts means that margin calls could be potentially destabilising if spreads were to widen 
abruptly. 
 
7.3. CREDIT EVENTS 
CDS compensations are triggered upon the occurrence of pre-determined credit events, the standard 
definitions of which are laid out in the 2003 Credit Derivative Definitions of the International 
Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA). In the case of euro-area sovereigns, three types of 
credit events apply; Failure to Pay, Repudiation/Moratorium, and Restructuring. 
 
a. Failure to Pay: a failure to pay credit event occurs when the reference entity fails to 
make payments on one of its obligations before the expiry of grace periods written into 
the obligation. 
b. Repudiation/Moratorium: a repudiation/moratorium credit event occurs when the 
reference entity either disaffirms, disclaims, repudiates, rejects, or challenges the 
validity of an obligation concurrently with the occurrence of a Failure to Pay event. 
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c. Restructuring: restructuring credit events are broader in scope than the above two, and 
thus require more criteria to be met. A restructuring event can occur in the following 
cases: 
• If the interest rate or coupon amount is changed from the contractually agreed 
terms; 
• If the principal amount is changed from the contractually agreed terms; 
• If the payment of any obligation, principal, interest or premium, is postponed 
or deferred with reference to the contractually agreed terms; 
• If the ranking of an obligation is changed, causing is to be subordinated to 
another; 
• If the currency or composition of payments (principal of interest) is changed to 
a currency that is not a “Permitted Currency”. 
Other criteria must be met for a restructuring credit event to be declared; namely, the above 
events must result directly or indirectly from deterioration in the reference entity’s creditworthiness 
or financial conditions and must occur in a form that binds all holders. 
Previously, the occurrence of a credit event was determined by one of the counterparties by the 
delivery of a credit event notice describing the event in detail, leaving open the possibility of 
disputes. The 2009 supplement to the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivative Definitions instead established 
regional Determination Committees, tasked with making market-wide binding decisions on the 
occurrence of credit events (ECB, 2009). The Determination Committees are comprised of 15 
voting members and 3 non-voting members.12 An 80 percent majority is required for decision; if 
this supermajority is not obtained, the decision is taken by majority vote unless an external review 
panel opposes it (unanimously or by a 2/3 majority, the panel comprising 3 members). As 
highlighted by the ECB (2009), the Determination Committees “improve the certainty of processes 
following a credit event and remove the operational burden”. 
Unfortunately, as far as CDS triggers are concerned, there are no historical experiences that can 
serve as guides: because all restructurings are different, for a start, but also because no sovereign 
restructuring events have occurred under the current ISDA definitions and with the Determination 
Committees in place. The settlement protocol following the default of Ecuador in 2008 was the first 
protocol published by ISDA in reference to a sovereign credit event (ISDA, 2008). It should be 
noted that any form of purely voluntary exchanges would most likely not trigger CDS, as they 
would entail substituting one obligation for another and those unwilling to participate could simply 
retain their old bonds.  
                                                        
12  As of May 2011, the 15 voting members for Europe are: Bank of America / Merrill Lynch, Barclays, BNP 
Paribas, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Société Générale, UBS, 
BlackRock, BlueMountain Capital, Citadel Investment Group, D.E. Shaw Group and Rabobank International. 
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7.4. AVAILABLE STATISTICS ON EXPOSURES 
The figures published by DTCC show the gross notional and net amounts of single-name CDS 
written on entities. The gross amount is the sum of CDS contracts bought (or sold). However, this 
figure does not take into account the fact that market participants can (and do) simultaneously buy 
and sell protection on the same reference entity, for trading purposes, but also because closing a 
CDS position often involves taking on an offsetting position rather than transferring the contract to 
another counterparty. The net notional values published calculated with reference to individual 
market participants, and are equal to the sum of net protection bought (or sold) by net buyers (or net 
sellers). As such, they represent the maximum possible net funds transfers between net sellers and 
net buyers. In practice, amounts transferred will be lower. The cash settlement procedure involves 
transferring only the difference between the notional value of an insured bond, for instance, and its 
market price/the recovery rate. 
Statistics on the net positions of individual counterparties are not available. This hinders the 
evaluation of systemic risk. 
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8. APPENDIX 2: RECENT SOVEREIGN DEBT DEFAULTS AND RESTRUCTURINGS: 
FURTHER INFORMATION 
Dave Manuel’s website (http://www.davemanuel.com/2010/02/12/the-last-13-major-sovereign-
bond-defaults/) list 13 recent sovereign defaults: 
 
Venezuela, July 1998 - defaulted on $270 million worth of domestic currency bonds 
 
Russia, August 1998 - a massive $72.7 billion default (first missed payments on local Treasury 
obligations and later extended to include foreign currency obligations); Russia's debts were 
eventually restructured in later years. 
 
Ukraine, September 1998 - $1.27 billion dollar default 
 
Pakistan, July 1999 - defaulted in July of 1999 but quickly resolved the situation 
 
Ecuador, August 1999 - missed a payment, leading an eventual restructuring of over 90 percent of 
their bonds. Default amount was around $6.6 billion 
 
Ukraine, January 2000 - defaulted again ($1.06 billion) of foreign currency denominated bonds; the 
situation was rectified by exchanging their current obligations for bonds with a longer term and 
lower coupon. 
 
Peru, September 2000 - defaulted on $4.87 billion of debt but rectified the situation within 30 days 
 
Argentina, November 2001 - a massive $82.26 billion dollar default 
 
Moldova, June 2002 - defaulted on $145 million worth of debt, only to rectify the situation a short 
while later, once to default once again 
 
Uruguay, May 2003 - defaulted on $5.7 billion dollars worth of debt; the country eventually 
completed a restructuring of their debt obligations with their bondholders 
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Dominican Republic, April 2005 - Defaulted on $1.62 billion dollars worth of debt; eventually 
completed a debt restructuring that ended up extending the maturity of their debt obligations by five 
years 
 
Belize, December 2006 - Defaulted on $242 million dollars worth of debt 
 
Ecuador, December 2008 - Defaulted on $3.2 billion dollars worth of debt obligations after calling 
several of their previous debt offerings "illegal and illegitimate", ie the default is for "moral" 
reasons, not the lack of resources to service the debt. 
 
I could not find quarterly GDP data for Belize, but added Indonesia, a country that in June 1998 
concluded an agreement for restructuring interbank debt by the end of March 1999, and in 
September 1998 an agreement on rescheduling and refinancing Indonesia’s bilateral external debt 
to official creditors ($ 4.1 billions covering principal payments on official debt and export credit for 
the period August 1998 to March 2000). 
 
 38
Figure A.1 
Quarterly real effective exchange rate developments before and  
after twelve public debt defaults or restructurings during the past  
15 years (quarter of restructuring = 100)  
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Note: the real effective exchange rate is calculated by us against 143 countries of the world 
using consumer prices indexes. A fall in the index indicates real depreciation. Source: 
Bruegel. 
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Table A.1 
 Time to market access after defaults/debt restructurings  
in the 1980s and 1990s 
Default Resumption of Market Access Country N° of years until resumption 
1980 1980 Peru 0 
1981, 84 1994 Costa Rica 13 
1981 1994 Honduras 13 
1981 1983 Jamaica 2 
1981 1988 Madagascar 7 
1981 1982 Poland 1 
1981 1985 Romania 14 
1982 1986 Argentina 4 
1982 1987 Ecuador 5 
1982 1985 Mexico 3 
1982 1989 Nigeria 7 
1982 1982 Turkey 0 
1983 1983 Brazil 0 
1983 1990 Chile 7 
1983 1992 Cote d’Ivoire 9 
1983 1985 Morocco 2 
1983 1983 Niger 0 
1983 1993 Peru 9 
1983 1988 Philippines 5 
1983 1992 Uruguay 9 
1983 1987 Venezuela 12 
1984 1988 Egypt 4 
1985 1988 South Africa 3 
1986 1988 Gabon 2 
1986 1988 Morocco 2 
1986 1990 Romania 4 
1987 1990 Ghana 3 
1987 1988 Iraq 1 
1988 1992 Trinidad and Tobago 4 
1989 1989 Argentina 0 
1989 1993 Jordan 4 
1989 1989 South Africa 0 
Average 1980s 
Median 1980s 
4.7 
4.0 
1991 1991 Algeria 0 
1991 1992 Ethiopia 1 
1991 1992 Russian Federation 1 
1992 1992 Philippines 0 
1993 1993 South Africa 0 
1995 1995 Venezuela 0 
1998 1998 Indonesia 0 
1998 1998 Ukraine 0 
1998 2000 Russian Federation 1* 
1999 2000 Ecuador 1 
Average 1990s 
Median 1990s 
0.3 
0.0 
Source: Gelos, Sandleris and Sahay (2004). 
Notes. The table lists episodes of debt default between 1980 and 1999, covering only countries that had 
access to the capital market during the year of default or during the two preceding years and that regained 
market access until 2000. Access is defined as issuance of public or publicly guaranteed bond or syndicated 
loan. Year of default is defined as year in which the sovereign defaulted on foreign-currency bond or bank 
debt according to Standard & Poor’s.*continued to acess in 1998 
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